, because I was trying to think through the question of what exactly people are worrying about when they worry about the environment. In opinion polls and academic discourse, the idea of environmental concern has become so well institutionalized that it is easy to take people's concern for granted. Yet, it is unclear whether people are concerned about environmental despoliation because of the risks to themselves, to human health and amenity more broadly, to wild animals, or for some other reason. Mainstream sociological studies of environmental problems and phenomena strayed away from this topic in the 1990s and had got somewhat bogged down in arguments over the reality of environmental problems. Probably no one actually thought such problems were literally unreal, but there was a lot of debate about the extent to which social concerns over environmental issues were to be explained chiefly in terms of the problems themselves or in terms of people's mobilization around those problems. For example, in the case of the ozone layer, which is very remote geographically and conceptually from everyday experience, the question is as follows: Should the rise of social concern and activism around ozone protection be explained primarily in terms of the actual ozone hole or primarily in terms of successful moral entrepreneurship by problem claims makers such as environmental pressure groups? Adherents of the first view are realists; the latter are constructivists.
Although these realists and constructivists disagree about a great deal, there is one issue about which they appear to be in implicit agreement: namely, that environmental concern is to be understood as a worry about specific environmental problems. To be concerned about the environment is precisely to be worried about ozone depletion, noxious air pollution, the contamination of drinking water, the loss of soil quality, and so on. Yet, there is something unsatisfactory about this tacitly agreed position, because environmental concern seems to be both broader and less specific than a set of anxieties over particular environmental problems. I turned to McKibben's (1989) book because, although he detailed many of the same environmental worries, his account of their significance and psychological impact was very different. He proposed that environmental anxiety was much more than the sum of discrete environmental problems. Of course, other social scientific commentators had already picked up on this very point. From early on, Mary Douglas had famously suggested that nature worries are worries about society that we inscribe onto nature (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983) . Taking the example of dietary prohibitions, she pointed out that the complex religious rules about what people may or may not eat seem to be interpretable best in terms of animals that fit into common categories and animals that violate those categorizations. The animals that fit are fit to eat; those that resist classification should be avoided. Douglas concluded that when people draw these boundaries, their boundary making is not indicative of what nature is really like. Instead, human societies project their societal concerns onto nature and see them reflected there. Douglas and her followers have tried to do various versions of this exercise by pointing out, for example, the way in which pollution problems were attractive as a kind of problem to certain kinds of subcultures within the United States who saw the protection of their personal space from others' interventions as the thing to be prized (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983, pp. 126-151) . Douglas takes very literally the idea that our nature worries are our worries about ourselves symbolically re-presented in nature. Of course, in that, she follows Durkheim who suggested that the only force that was big enough to be of cosmological significance was society itself.
More recently, Beck (1995) and Giddens (2002) have also taken a view of environmental worries as, if not exactly symbolic, at least worries about something other than the environment itself. Thus, Beck, in his book Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, expressed it like this: "The ecological movement is not an environmental movement but a social, inward movement which utilizes 'nature' as a parameter for certain questions" (1995, p. 55) . For Beck and Giddens, the "certain questions" are about the "humanization of nature." These authors point out that risks and nature worries in contemporary societies come not principally from uncontrolled natural events but from the unintended consequences of human interventions in nature. In contemporary, industrialized societies, citizens are freed from worries about being too hot or of hypothermia because they (overwhelmingly) have access to powered cooling and heating. In this sense, people are freed from weather worries, but at the same time, people are now dependent for their safety on the good behavior of the operators of the nuclear power stations that partly meet their energy demands. The new genetically modified food-production techniques currently on offer boast (plausibly or not) of a future free from anxieties about food scarcity but leave us dependent on the adequacy of the regulatory system and the scientific testing of genetically modified organisms for our food safety and the environmental well-being of our countryside. On Beck's view, where we feared nature or the gods who controlled it, we now worry about the dependability of organizations and regulatory systems.
On this view, therefore, modern environmental concern is an anxiety about the environment only in a special and rather confined sense. More important, this kind of anxiety is not limited to topics commonly thought of as environmental. For example, a parallel story can be told about the medical mastery over nature. Early modern worries about external sources of disease were partly displaced by optimism about new drugs and treatments before it turned out that modern medical and animal management practices, using rather indiscriminate dosages of antibiotics, Yearley / THE END OR HUMANIZATION OF NATURE 199 were leading to super-bugs and treatment-resistant illnesses. Most recently, there has been widespread concern about possible military uses of smallpox. This disease was all but eradicated worldwide and held only in research facilities in the two leading cold war powers. In a smallpox-free world, vaccination programs had largely been suspended. Worry about an external threat from a marauding disease is now replaced by concerns about the integrity and dependability of the scientists and technical officials guarding the virus samples. We realize we have delegated control over much of the environment to a few agencies and people. Accordingly, environmental concern is a concern that these agencies may be no safer than wild nature previously was. In extreme cases-as with terrorist access to biological weapons, possibly based on smallpox-harms may be imposed deliberately, not adventitiously. On this view, contemporary societies are characterized by continuing concerns over potential self-imposed risks. Environmentalism is simply one facet of late-modern risk anxiety.
In other words, within social scientific studies of the environment, there is a different kind of contest going on from the realist/constructivist one of a decade ago. This new disagreement is, as I see it, more of a clash between what I term substantivists and people who take a more symbolic reading. That is, the contest is between, on one hand, analysts who think if you want to understand environmental concern you go to claims makers about the environment and to material deterioration in the quality of the environment itself and, on the other, authors who believe that what you need to do is to read this cultural message for its underlying content.
My recent rereading of The End of Nature was stimulated by the realization that, without being explicitly involved in this debate, McKibben (1989) offers the reader a presentation that throws fresh and important light on this substantivist/symbolic divide. McKibben offers a lament that nature, as we have come to understand it, is no longer available to us. He emphasizes that there is nowhere that is pristine nature any more. In part, this is because there have been Toyota Landcruisers into every bit of wilderness that you could imagine and tourists have trekked up all the remote peaks. The recent anniversary of the scaling of Mount Everest would be an example of this latter point: In the anniversary year, you had to book a slot for your assault on the summit, and there was even a queue to make the final part of the ascent. But there is also the sense that through our polluting activities we have made sure that there is nowhere on earth that has not been affected by environmental changes that we have brought. He picked climate change as the biggest exemplification of this point and stressed that, because we are altering the climate system, there is going to be literally nowhere on the earth that will remain untouched by human activity. Soon or maybe already, there will be no way you can go and say, "Look, the habitat here is undisturbed," because everywhere has been disturbed by global climate change.
For McKibben (1989) , the sadness of this is not just substantive. It is not just that trees and insects may not be able to adjust to anthropogenic climate change. It is something else in addition. As he expressed it, An idea, a relationship, can go extinct just like an animal or a plant. The idea in this case is "nature", the separate and wild province, the world apart from man to which he adapted. . . . In the past we have spoiled and polluted parts of that nature, inflicted environmental "damage". But that was like stabbing a man with toothpicks: though hurt, annoyed, and degraded, it did not touch vital organs or block the path of the lymph or blood. We never thought that we had wrecked nature. Deep down, we never really thought we could: it was too big and too old. . . . [But now we find we] have produced the carbon dioxide-we have ended nature. (McKibben, 1989, pp. 43-44) In the summer of 2002, we had great excitement in Britain because we had the hottest day that we had ever had. At least it was the hottest day if you lived in the south of England where it was more that 100°F. McKibben (1989) traced the warming of the climate, this phenomenon that was apparent even in the early 1990s, and he observed that "a child born now will never know a natural summer" (p. 55). The record temperatures are meaningless now because they are, as he said, "turbo-assisted" by human interventions in the atmosphere. There are no natural records for warm weather any more, because there is no natural climate system any longer.
For me, the distinctive and unusually powerful aspect of his work is that-as well as documenting the lamentable facts of widespread environmental changeMcKibben's (1989) account conveys a very strong sense of the grounds for his feeling of lamentation. Environmental damage matters to us because we suddenly sense that we have unwittingly taken control of a system that we thought was external to us. We are alone in charge of the planetary environment without the power, knowledge, or institutions to cope with the demands of management. Of course, this expression of our worry-the phenomenology of our nature worries-is not presented by McKibben as the result of social scientific investigation. It is a personal judgment rather than a systematic survey. He does not set out to demonstrate that this version of environmental concern is the typical or average response from the U.S., European, or Northern citizen. Nonetheless, this seems to me convincing as a phenomenology of our concerns about the environment in a way that Beck's (1995) and Giddens's (2002) accounts are not.
Risk society authors view contemporary environmental concern as a worry about who controls our safety and regulates risks on our behalf. At issue is the citizen's lack of power and control. McKibben's (1989) more personal account stresses people's overall sense of loss and regret. Both types of account engage with people's experience of the difficulties of living after nature. The versions offered by Beck (1995) and Giddens (2002) read to me like rationalized accounts of our worries; McKibben reads to me like an expression of how our worries feel. For sociologists and organizational theorists, I believe, the book helps us to flesh out the urgent but neglected question of what precisely we are worrying about when we worry about the environment.
